app/dialog/actions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""Execution of *dialog* actions returned by `MonitoringService.after_data_change()` (ADR-007).
+
+The rules (lane B, `config/rules.yaml`) decide WHAT happens; this module only turns an already chosen action
+into replies. `alert` / `enhanced_monitoring` are handled by lane B itself (persisted + doctor notified), so they
+are ignored here. While a crisis is open only crisis-relevant actions (crisis, safety plan, risk screen) reach
+the patient: no medication tips or visit offers in the middle of a crisis.
+"""
+
+from collections.abc import Iterable
+from typing import Any
+
+from app.core.rules import Action
+from app.db.clinical import SafetyPlan
+from app.dialog.contracts import Button, Reply
+from app.dialog.crisis import crisis_open, open_crisis
+from app.dialog.fsm import Ctx, Step
+from app.dialog.scale_session import active_scale, add_pending
+
+# med_info topic → phrase intent of `config/texts/phrases.yaml` (the LLM only rephrases the template).
+_MED_INFO_INTENTS = {"delayed_effect": "quit_intent", "alcohol_interaction": "alcohol_info", "nausea": "nausea_info"}
+_CRISIS_SAFE = {"crisis", "show_safety_plan", "schedule_scale"}
+
+
+def _plan_line(step: Any) -> str:
+    if isinstance(step, dict):
+        return ": ".join(str(v) for v in step.values() if v)
+    return str(step)
+
+
+async def safety_plan_reply(ctx: Ctx, block: str | None = None) -> Reply:
+    """The plan composed with the doctor (`safety_plans`), or the Stanley–Brown template from config."""
+    row = await ctx.session.get(SafetyPlan, ctx.token)
+    steps = [_plan_line(s) for s in row.steps] if row is not None and row.steps else ctx.texts.safety_plan.template
+    lines = [ctx.texts.safety_plan.title, *(f"{i}. {s}" for i, s in enumerate(steps, 1))]
+    if block == "means_restriction":
+        lines += ["", ctx.texts.safety_plan.means_restriction]
+    return Reply(text="\n".join(lines), kind="safety_plan")
+
+
+async def execute(ctx: Ctx, actions: Iterable[Action]) -> Step:
+    step = Step()
+    shown_plan = False
+    for action in actions:
+        if crisis_open({**ctx.data, **step.data}) and action.type not in _CRISIS_SAFE:
+            continue
+        if action.type == "crisis":
+            if not crisis_open({**ctx.data, **step.data}):
+                step = step.then(open_crisis(ctx, categories=[], source=f"rule:{action.code}"))
+        elif action.type == "show_safety_plan" and not shown_plan:
+            shown_plan = True
+            step = step.then(Step(replies=[await safety_plan_reply(ctx, action.params.get("block"))]))
+        elif action.type == "schedule_scale" and action.params.get("scale"):
+            scale_id = str(action.params["scale"])
+            if active_scale(step.next_state or ctx.state) == scale_id:
+                continue  # already being asked
+            data = {**ctx.data, **step.data}
+            pending = add_pending(data, scale_id, bool(action.params.get("scheduled", False)))
+            step = step.then(Step(data={"pending_scales": pending}))
+        elif action.type == "med_info":
+            intent = _MED_INFO_INTENTS.get(str(action.params.get("topic")), "default")
+            text = await ctx.gateway.phrase(intent, {})
+            step = step.then(Step(replies=[Reply(text=text, kind="info")]))
+        elif action.type == "suggest_visit":
+            text = await ctx.gateway.phrase("book_visit_offer", {})
+            button = Button(label=ctx.texts.visit.button, data="menu:visit")
+            step = step.then(Step(replies=[Reply(text=text, buttons=[[button]], kind="info")]))
+        elif action.type == "reach_out":
+            topic = str(action.params.get("topic", "default"))
+            texts = ctx.texts.reach_out
+            text = {"silence": texts.silence, "missed_doses": texts.missed_doses}.get(topic, texts.default)
+            step = step.then(Step(replies=[Reply(text=text)]))
+        # alert / enhanced_monitoring: lane B persists and notifies; nothing to say to the patient.
+    return step

app/dialog/crisis.py

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+"""Crisis path of the dialog (guardrail #2): fixed texts only, never generated by the LLM.
+
+Decisions:
+  * The crisis script (`app.core.safety.crisis_reply`, `config/texts/crisis.yaml`) is sent verbatim, once per
+    open crisis. "Open" = `data["crisis"]["open"]` — set when the crisis starts, cleared only by the doctor's
+    acknowledgement (`doctor_ack`), so a patient repeating the phrase does not get the same long script again:
+    they get a short fixed "я рядом, врач уже уведомлён" + emergency resources instead.
+  * Entering the crisis drops unfinished scale sessions (their answered items are already stored item by item):
+    nothing else is asked while the patient is in crisis, except the C-SSRS screen.
+  * Without valid consent (before consent, after refusal/revocation, minors) we still answer a crisis message —
+    protecting life is the one processing ground that does not need consent (152-FZ art. 10 p. 2.3) — but with
+    a variant WITHOUT "your doctor has been notified", because no doctor is notified, and nothing is stored.
+"""
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from app.core.safety import CrisisResource, CrisisScript, crisis_reply
+from app.dialog.contracts import Reply
+from app.dialog.fsm import Ctx, Step
+
+
+def crisis_open(data: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    return bool((data.get("crisis") or {}).get("open"))
+
+
+def _resource_lines(resources: list[CrisisResource]) -> list[str]:
+    return [f"• {r.name}: {r.phone}" + (f" ({r.note})" if r.note else "") for r in resources]
+
+
+def open_crisis(ctx: Ctx, categories: list[str], source: str) -> Step:
+    """Start the crisis (full script) or, if one is already open, send the short repeat text.
+
+    `source` is a code for the dashboard/audit trail: "safety:lexicon", "safety:llm", "scale:phq9", "rule:<id>".
+    """
+    script = crisis_reply(categories)
+    if crisis_open(ctx.data):
+        text = "\n".join([ctx.texts.crisis.repeat, *_resource_lines(script.resources)])
+        return Step(replies=[Reply(text=text, kind="crisis")])
+    crisis = {"open": True, "opened_at": ctx.now.isoformat(), "source": source, "variant": script.variant}
+    return Step(
+        replies=[Reply(text=script.text, kind="crisis")],
+        next_state="crisis",
+        data={"crisis": crisis, "scales": None},
+    )
+
+
+def no_consent_crisis_text(script: CrisisScript) -> str:
+    """Crisis script without the "doctor notified" line — for people we may not (or did not) notify about."""
+    return "\n".join([script.body, "", *_resource_lines(script.resources), "", script.grounding])

app/dialog/engine.py

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+"""Dialog engine (issue #10, ADR-004): `Engine.handle(token, event) -> list[Reply]`, channel-agnostic.
+
+Pipeline for one incoming event (SPEC §3, guardrails #1, #2, #3):
+
+  text event
+    1. scrub()            raw text → ScrubbedText. Raw text is never stored, logged or sent anywhere.
+    2. consent gate       no valid consent → no LLM, nothing stored; only the local crisis lexicon runs
+                          (protecting life does not need consent) and the core flow shows consent/refusal.
+    3. safety.check()     lexicon FIRST. Lexicon ACUTE → the LLM is not called at all. Otherwise the LLM risk
+                          classifier is an auxiliary signal combined as max(lexicon, llm): it can only raise risk.
+         ACUTE    → fixed crisis script verbatim (once per open crisis), state `crisis`, structured
+                    `safety_events` fact for lane B, MonitoringService.after_data_change() (lane B alerts).
+         POSSIBLE → C-SSRS screen (scale session) and back to the previous state (or crisis if high).
+    4. FSM                the current state's handler (`app/dialog/flows/*`, `app/dialog/scale_session.py`).
+  button / system / start events skip 1–3 (no free text) and go through the same FSM.
+
+  After the FSM step: if clinical data were written → commit → `after_data_change()` → the returned *dialog*
+  actions are executed (`app/dialog/actions.py`). The engine never creates alerts (ADR-007).
+  Then a queued scale starts if the FSM rests (idle; only the C-SSRS while in crisis).
+  Persist: inbound message (scrubbed) + outbound replies + `dialog_state` — only with active consent.
+
+Logs carry only the token, states and event codes (guardrail #8).
+"""
+
+import logging
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Any
+
+from sqlalchemy.exc import InterfaceError, OperationalError
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.core import clock, safety
+from app.core.privacy import scrub
+from app.core.safety import SafetyResult, crisis_reply
+from app.core.types import RiskLevel, ScrubbedText
+from app.db import repo
+from app.db.session import get_clinical_session
+from app.dialog import scale_session
+from app.dialog.actions import execute
+from app.dialog.contracts import Event, Reply, register_engine
+from app.dialog.crisis import crisis_open, no_consent_crisis_text, open_crisis
+from app.dialog.flows import load_flows
+from app.dialog.flows.core import close_crisis, revoke
+from app.dialog.fsm import NO_CONSENT_STATES, RESTING_STATES, Ctx, Step, apply_data, enter_hook_for, handler_for
+from app.dialog.texts import DialogTexts, load_dialog_texts
+from app.llm.gateway import LLMGateway, get_gateway
+from app.services.contracts import MonitoringService, get_monitoring
+
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+# Enter hooks may chain (scale done → next onboarding state → next scale); a cycle must not hang a request.
+MAX_ENTER_CHAIN = 8
+# DB unreachable: answer safely instead of failing the channel (connectivity errors only — bugs must surface).
+_DB_DOWN = (OSError, OperationalError, InterfaceError)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _Run:
+    replies: list[Reply] = field(default_factory=list)
+    notify: bool = False
+
+
+def _consented(ctx: Ctx) -> bool:
+    return ctx.data.get("consent") is True and ctx.state not in NO_CONSENT_STATES
+
+
+class Engine:
+    """Real `DialogEngine`. `gateway` / `monitoring` are injectable for tests; by default resolved per call so
+    a monitoring implementation registered later (lane B, #38) is picked up."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *, gateway: LLMGateway | None = None, monitoring: MonitoringService | None = None) -> None:
+        self._gateway = gateway
+        self._monitoring = monitoring
+
+    async def handle(self, token: str, event: Event) -> list[Reply]:
+        texts = load_dialog_texts()
+        try:
+            async with get_clinical_session() as session:
+                return await self._handle(token, event, session, texts)
+        except _DB_DOWN as exc:
+            log.error("dialog db unavailable token=%s event=%s error=%s", token, event.type, type(exc).__name__)
+            return _degraded(event, texts)
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ pipeline
+
+    async def _handle(self, token: str, event: Event, session: AsyncSession, texts: DialogTexts) -> list[Reply]:
+        row = await repo.get_dialog_state(session, token)
+        ctx = Ctx(
+            token=token,
+            state=row.state if row is not None else "new",
+            data=dict(row.data or {}) if row is not None else {},
+            now=clock.now(),
+            session=session,
+            gateway=self._gateway or get_gateway(),
+            monitoring=self._monitoring or get_monitoring(),
+            texts=texts,
+        )
+        state_before = ctx.state
+        run = _Run()
+
+        await self._apply(ctx, await self._route(ctx, event), run)
+
+        if run.notify:
+            # Monitoring (lane B) reads the DB in its own session: commit our writes first.
+            await self._save_state(ctx)
+            await session.commit()
+            actions = await ctx.monitoring.after_data_change(token)
+            await self._apply(ctx, await execute(ctx, actions), run)
+
+        await self._apply(ctx, await self._start_pending(ctx), run)
+
+        if _consented(ctx):
+            for reply in run.replies:
+                # Outgoing texts may quote the safety plan (names of relatives) — scrub before storing too.
+                await repo.add_message(
+                    session, token=token, direction="out", text=scrub(reply.text), ts=ctx.now, fsm_state=ctx.state
+                )
+        await self._save_state(ctx)
+        log.info(
+            "dialog token=%s event=%s code=%s state=%s->%s replies=%d",
+            token,
+            event.type,
+            _event_code(event),
+            state_before,
+            ctx.state,
+            len(run.replies),
+        )
+        return run.replies
+
+    async def _route(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+        consented = _consented(ctx)
+        if event.type == "text":
+            # (1) scrub before anything else: from here on only ScrubbedText exists for this message.
+            ctx.text = scrub(event.text or "")
+            if consented and _is_revoke_command(event.text or "", ctx.texts):
+                return await revoke(ctx)
+            if not consented:
+                return await self._no_consent_text(ctx, event)
+            await self._store_in(ctx, ctx.text)
+            return await self._safety(ctx, event)
+
+        if event.type == "button":
+            if consented and event.button == "consent:revoke":
+                return await revoke(ctx)
+            if consented:
+                await self._store_in(ctx, scrub(f"[button] {event.button}"))  # button data comes from the client
+            return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
+
+        if event.type == "system":
+            if event.system == "doctor_ack":
+                return close_crisis(ctx)
+            if not consented:
+                return Step()  # nothing is pushed to people without consent
+            if event.system == "scale_due" and event.params.get("scale"):
+                scheduled = bool(event.params.get("scheduled", True))
+                pending = scale_session.add_pending(ctx.data, str(event.params["scale"]), scheduled)
+                return Step(data={"pending_scales": pending})  # starts now if resting, else after the current step
+            return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
+
+        return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)  # start
+
+    async def _no_consent_text(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+        assert ctx.text is not None
+        # Lexicon only: without consent the text must not reach the LLM (third-party processing).
+        result = safety.check(ctx.text)
+        if result.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
+            log.warning("safety acute without consent token=%s rules=%s", ctx.token, result.matched_rules)
+            return Step(replies=[Reply(text=no_consent_crisis_text(crisis_reply(result.categories)), kind="crisis")])
+        return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
+
+    async def _safety(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+        """Guardrail #2: the safety decision is made before any LLM sees the message for anything else."""
+        assert ctx.text is not None
+        lexicon = safety.check(ctx.text)
+        if lexicon.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
+            result = lexicon  # an acute message never reaches the LLM — not even the risk classifier
+        else:
+            result = safety.check(ctx.text, llm_signal=await ctx.gateway.risk_classify(ctx.text))
+
+        if result.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
+            handled = "crisis_repeat" if crisis_open(ctx.data) else "crisis_script"
+            log.warning("safety acute token=%s rules=%s handled=%s", ctx.token, result.matched_rules, handled)
+            step = open_crisis(ctx, result.categories, source=f"safety:{result.source}")
+            step.data["safety_events"] = self._safety_events(ctx, result, handled)
+            step.notify_monitoring = True  # lane B escalates to the doctor on call
+            return step
+
+        if result.level == RiskLevel.POSSIBLE:
+            screen = ctx.texts.settings.risk_screen_scale
+            if self._can_screen(ctx, screen):
+                step = await scale_session.start_scale(
+                    ctx, screen, return_state=ctx.state, scheduled=False, intro=ctx.texts.scale.risk_screen_intro
+                )
+                step.data["risk_screen_at"] = ctx.now.isoformat()
+                handled = "risk_screen"
+            else:
+                step = await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
+                handled = "dispatched"
+            log.info("safety possible token=%s rules=%s handled=%s", ctx.token, result.matched_rules, handled)
+            step.data["safety_events"] = self._safety_events(ctx, result, handled)
+            step.notify_monitoring = True
+            return step
+
+        return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
+
+    def _can_screen(self, ctx: Ctx, screen: str) -> bool:
+        if crisis_open(ctx.data) or scale_session.active_scale(ctx.state) == screen:
+            return False
+        last = ctx.data.get("risk_screen_at")
+        if last is None:
+            return True
+        hours = (ctx.now - datetime.fromisoformat(last)).total_seconds() / 3600
+        return hours >= ctx.texts.settings.cssrs_cooldown_hours
+
+    def _safety_events(self, ctx: Ctx, result: SafetyResult, handled: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        """Structured safety fact for lane B (#38): no text, only codes. Newest last, capped."""
+        event = {
+            "ts": ctx.now.isoformat(),
+            "level": result.level.name.lower(),
+            "categories": result.categories,
+            "rules": result.matched_rules,
+            "source": result.source,
+            "handled": handled,
+            "state": ctx.state,
+        }
+        events = [*(ctx.data.get("safety_events") or []), event]
+        return events[-ctx.texts.settings.max_safety_events :]
+
+    async def _dispatch(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+        handler = handler_for(ctx.state)
+        if handler is None:
+            # A state from a removed/renamed flow: recover instead of getting stuck.
+            log.error("dialog unknown state token=%s state=%s", ctx.token, ctx.state)
+            return Step(next_state="idle" if _consented(ctx) else "new")
+        return await handler(ctx, event)
+
+    async def _apply(self, ctx: Ctx, step: Step, run: _Run, depth: int = 0) -> None:
+        run.replies.extend(step.replies)
+        apply_data(ctx.data, step.data)
+        run.notify = run.notify or step.notify_monitoring
+        if not step.next_state or step.next_state == ctx.state:
+            return
+        ctx.state = step.next_state
+        hook = enter_hook_for(ctx.state)
+        if hook is None:
+            return
+        if depth >= MAX_ENTER_CHAIN:
+            log.error("dialog enter chain too long token=%s state=%s", ctx.token, ctx.state)
+            return
+        await self._apply(ctx, await hook(ctx), run, depth + 1)
+
+    async def _start_pending(self, ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+        """Start a queued scale when nothing else is being asked. In crisis only the risk screen may run."""
+        pending = list(ctx.data.get("pending_scales") or [])
+        if not pending or ctx.state not in RESTING_STATES:
+            return Step()
+        screen = ctx.texts.settings.risk_screen_scale
+        if ctx.state == "crisis":
+            pending_screen = [p for p in pending if p["scale"] == screen]
+            if not pending_screen:
+                return Step()
+            item = pending_screen[0]
+        else:
+            item = pending[0]
+        rest = [p for p in pending if p is not item]
+        step = await scale_session.start_scale(
+            ctx,
+            item["scale"],
+            return_state=ctx.state,
+            scheduled=bool(item.get("scheduled", True)),
+            intro=ctx.texts.scale.risk_screen_intro if item["scale"] == screen else None,
+        )
+        step.data["pending_scales"] = rest or None
+        return step
+
+    async def _store_in(self, ctx: Ctx, text: ScrubbedText) -> None:
+        await repo.add_message(ctx.session, token=ctx.token, direction="in", text=text, ts=ctx.now, fsm_state=ctx.state)
+
+    async def _save_state(self, ctx: Ctx) -> None:
+        await repo.set_dialog_state(ctx.session, token=ctx.token, state=ctx.state, data=ctx.data, now=ctx.now)
+
+
+def _is_revoke_command(raw: str, texts: DialogTexts) -> bool:
+    return raw.strip().lower().rstrip(".!") in texts.commands.revoke
+
+
+def _event_code(event: Event) -> str:
+    if event.type == "button":
+        return event.button or ""
+    if event.type == "system":
+        return event.system or ""
+    return "-"
+
+
+def _degraded(event: Event, texts: DialogTexts) -> list[Reply]:
+    """DB down: still answer a crisis message (lexicon only, no "doctor notified" — nobody could be notified)."""
+    if event.type == "text" and event.text:
+        result = safety.check(scrub(event.text))
+        if result.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
+            return [Reply(text=no_consent_crisis_text(crisis_reply(result.categories)), kind="crisis")]
+    if event.type == "system":
+        return []
+    return [Reply(text=texts.unavailable, kind="info")]
+
+
+load_flows()
+register_engine(Engine)

app/dialog/flows/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+"""Dialog flows. Each module here registers its FSM states at import time (`@state`, `@on_enter`, `@trigger`).
+
+A new direction (veteran #36/#37, family, depression) is a new file `app/dialog/flows/<module>.py`; it is picked
+up automatically by `load_flows()` — the engine is not edited.
+"""
+
+import pkgutil
+from importlib import import_module
+
+
+def load_flows() -> None:
+    """Import every flow module of this package (core first, so flows may override core triggers)."""
+    import_module(f"{__name__}.core")
+    for info in sorted(pkgutil.iter_modules(__path__), key=lambda m: m.name):
+        if info.name != "core" and not info.name.startswith("_"):
+            import_module(f"{__name__}.{info.name}")

app/dialog/flows/core.py

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+"""Core flow shared by all modules: connect → consent → age gate → module onboarding → idle; crisis; revocation.
+
+    new ──start(code)──▶ consent ──«Согласен»──▶ age_gate ──adult──▶ <module>.onboarding.start … ──▶ idle
+                            │                       └──< 18──▶ minor (stop, child helpline)
+                            └──«Не согласен»──▶ refused (stop, /start to reconsider)
+    any consented state ──«Отозвать согласие»──▶ consent_revoked (silent; /start → consent again)
+    any ──ACUTE / item 9 / C-SSRS high──▶ crisis ──doctor_ack──▶ idle
+
+Consent and age are the registration step, so this module (and only it) touches the identity DB, through
+`app.db.identity_repo`, and only for consent / revocation / birth year (guardrail #5).
+"""
+
+import re
+
+from app.db import identity_repo, repo
+from app.db.session import get_identity_session
+from app.dialog.actions import safety_plan_reply
+from app.dialog.contracts import Button, Event, Reply
+from app.dialog.fsm import Ctx, Step, get_trigger, is_registered, on_enter, state, trigger
+from app.integrations.base import integrations
+from app.services.contracts import NoopMonitoring
+
+ADULT_AGE = 18
+_YEAR_RE = re.compile(r"\b(19\d{2}|20\d{2})\b")
+_AGE_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(\d{1,3})\s*(лет|год|года)?\s*$")
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- replies
+
+
+def consent_reply(ctx: Ctx) -> Reply:
+    t = ctx.texts.consent
+    buttons = [[Button(label=t.accept, data="consent:yes")], [Button(label=t.decline, data="consent:no")]]
+    return Reply(text=t.text, buttons=buttons, kind="question")
+
+
+def menu_reply(ctx: Ctx, text: str | None = None) -> Reply:
+    b = ctx.texts.idle.buttons
+    buttons = [
+        [Button(label=b.checkin, data="menu:checkin")],
+        [Button(label=b.med_question, data="menu:med_question")],
+        [Button(label=b.contact_doctor, data="menu:contact_doctor")],
+        [Button(label=b.revoke, data="consent:revoke")],
+    ]
+    return Reply(text=text or ctx.texts.idle.menu_prompt, buttons=buttons)
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- onboarding API
+
+
+async def onboarding_entry(ctx: Ctx, after: str | None = None) -> str:
+    """Entry state of the next module onboarding: `"{module}.onboarding.start"` for the first module of the
+    profile (after `after`, if given) that has such a state registered; `"idle"` when none is left."""
+    profile = await ctx.profile()
+    modules = list(profile.modules) if profile is not None and profile.modules else []
+    if after in modules:
+        modules = modules[modules.index(after) + 1 :]
+    for module in modules:
+        if is_registered(f"{module}.onboarding.start"):
+            return f"{module}.onboarding.start"
+    return "idle"
+
+
+async def finish_onboarding(ctx: Ctx, module: str | None = None) -> Step:
+    """A module flow calls this when its onboarding is done: next module's onboarding, or idle + welcome."""
+    nxt = await onboarding_entry(ctx, after=module)
+    if nxt == "idle":
+        return Step(replies=[menu_reply(ctx, ctx.texts.idle.welcome)], next_state="idle")
+    return Step(next_state=nxt)
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- new / consent
+
+
+@state("new")
+async def _new(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    code = event.params.get("code") if event.type == "start" else None
+    if code:
+        # Telegram deep link carries the doctor's one-time connect code; the web console passes the token
+        # directly (no code) — then the token is already known to the system.
+        person = await integrations.identity.verify(str(code))
+        if person is None or person.token != ctx.token:
+            return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.consent.code_invalid)])
+        if await ctx.profile() is None:
+            await repo.upsert_profile(ctx.session, token=ctx.token, doctor_id=person.doctor_id)
+    return Step(replies=[consent_reply(ctx)], next_state="consent")
+
+
+@state("consent")
+async def _consent(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button == "consent:yes":
+        version = ctx.texts.consent.version
+        async with get_identity_session() as s:
+            # None when the token has no identity record (web demo console) — the dialog state keeps the fact.
+            await identity_repo.record_consent(s, token=ctx.token, version=version, now=ctx.now)
+        data = {"consent": True, "consent_ver": version, "consent_at": ctx.now.isoformat(), "revoked_at": None}
+        return Step(next_state="age_gate", data=data)
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button == "consent:no":
+        return _refused_step(ctx)
+    # Anything else (incl. free text) is not processed before consent: show the consent text again.
+    return Step(replies=[consent_reply(ctx)])
+
+
+def _refused_step(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    button = Button(label=ctx.texts.consent.reconsider, data="consent:restart")
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.consent.refused, buttons=[[button]])], next_state="refused")
+
+
+@state("refused")
+async def _refused(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    if event.type == "start" or (event.type == "button" and event.button == "consent:restart"):
+        return Step(replies=[consent_reply(ctx)], next_state="consent")
+    if event.type == "system":
+        return Step()
+    return _refused_step(ctx)
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- age gate
+
+
+def _age_verdict(birth_year: int, current_year: int) -> str:
+    """Without the birthday the age is `current - birth_year` or one less; ask when the two disagree on 18."""
+    oldest, youngest = current_year - birth_year, current_year - birth_year - 1
+    if youngest >= ADULT_AGE:
+        return "adult"
+    if oldest < ADULT_AGE:
+        return "minor"
+    return "unsure"
+
+
+def _age_question(ctx: Ctx, note: str = "") -> Reply:
+    t = ctx.texts.age_gate
+    buttons = [[Button(label=t.adult, data="age:adult")], [Button(label=t.minor, data="age:minor")]]
+    return Reply(text="\n\n".join(p for p in (note, t.question) if p), buttons=buttons, kind="question")
+
+
+@on_enter("age_gate")
+async def _age_enter(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    profile = await ctx.profile()
+    birth_year = profile.birth_year if profile is not None else None
+    if birth_year is None:
+        async with get_identity_session() as s:
+            patient = await identity_repo.get_patient(s, ctx.token)
+            birth_year = patient.birth_year if patient is not None else None
+    if birth_year is not None:
+        verdict = _age_verdict(birth_year, ctx.now.year)
+        if verdict == "adult":
+            return await _adult(ctx)
+        if verdict == "minor":
+            return await _minor(ctx)
+    return Step(replies=[_age_question(ctx)])
+
+
+@state("age_gate")
+async def _age_gate(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button == "age:adult":
+        return await _adult(ctx)
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button == "age:minor":
+        return await _minor(ctx)
+    if event.type == "text" and ctx.text:
+        year = _YEAR_RE.search(ctx.text)
+        age_match = _AGE_RE.match(ctx.text)
+        if year:
+            birth_year = int(year.group(1))
+            verdict = _age_verdict(birth_year, ctx.now.year)
+            if verdict == "adult":
+                return await _adult(ctx, birth_year)
+            if verdict == "minor":
+                return await _minor(ctx)
+        elif age_match:
+            age = int(age_match.group(1))
+            return await (_adult(ctx) if age >= ADULT_AGE else _minor(ctx))
+        return Step(replies=[_age_question(ctx, ctx.texts.age_gate.unclear)])
+    return Step(replies=[_age_question(ctx)])
+
+
+async def _adult(ctx: Ctx, birth_year: int | None = None) -> Step:
+    if birth_year is not None and await ctx.profile() is not None:
+        await repo.upsert_profile(ctx.session, token=ctx.token, birth_year=birth_year)
+    return Step(data={"adult": True}).then(await finish_onboarding(ctx))
+
+
+async def _minor(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    # A minor cannot give this consent on their own: withdraw it and stop processing.
+    async with get_identity_session() as s:
+        await identity_repo.revoke_consent(s, token=ctx.token, now=ctx.now)
+    return Step(
+        replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.age_gate.minor_stop, kind="info")],
+        next_state="minor",
+        data={"consent": False, "minor": True},
+    )
+
+
+@state("minor")
+async def _minor_state(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    if event.type == "system":
+        return Step()
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.age_gate.minor_stop, kind="info")])
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- idle
+
+
+@state("idle")
+async def _idle(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    if event.type == "start":
+        return Step(replies=[menu_reply(ctx)])
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button:
+        handler = get_trigger(f"button:{event.button}")
+        return await handler(ctx, event) if handler else Step(replies=[menu_reply(ctx)])
+    if event.type == "system" and event.system:
+        handler = get_trigger(f"system:{event.system}")
+        return await handler(ctx, event) if handler else Step()
+    if event.type == "text":
+        handler = get_trigger("text:idle")
+        if handler:
+            return await handler(ctx, event)
+        # Neutral empathic reply; the LLM only rephrases the approved template (and is filtered).
+        return Step(replies=[menu_reply(ctx, await ctx.gateway.phrase("support"))])
+    return Step()
+
+
+# Default idle triggers — flows (#15, #36, #37) override them with `@trigger(..., replace=True)`.
+
+
+@trigger("button:menu:checkin")
+async def _menu_checkin(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.idle.stub_checkin)])
+
+
+@trigger("button:menu:med_question")
+async def _menu_med_question(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.idle.stub_med_question)])
+
+
+@trigger("button:menu:contact_doctor")
+async def _menu_contact_doctor(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    # A fact for lane B (#38): the patient asked the doctor to get in touch. No alert is created here (ADR-007).
+    requests = [*(ctx.data.get("contact_requests") or []), {"ts": ctx.now.isoformat()}][-20:]
+    return Step(
+        replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.idle.contact_doctor_ack)],
+        data={"contact_requests": requests},
+        notify_monitoring=True,
+    )
+
+
+@trigger("button:menu:visit")
+async def _menu_visit(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.idle.visit_stub)])
+
+
+@trigger("button:safety_plan")
+async def _show_plan(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[await safety_plan_reply(ctx)])
+
+
+@trigger("system:med_reminder")
+async def _med_reminder(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    drug = str(event.params.get("drug", ""))
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=await ctx.gateway.phrase("med_reminder", {"drug": drug}))])
+
+
+@trigger("system:daily_checkin")
+async def _daily_checkin(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[menu_reply(ctx, ctx.texts.idle.stub_checkin)])
+
+
+@trigger("system:reach_out")
+async def _reach_out(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.reach_out.default)])
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- crisis
+
+
+def close_crisis(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    """Doctor acknowledged the crisis: clear the flag; a C-SSRS still running returns to idle afterwards."""
+    crisis = {**(ctx.data.get("crisis") or {}), "open": False, "closed_at": ctx.now.isoformat()}
+    scales = {
+        sid: {**s, "return_state": "idle"} if s.get("return_state") == "crisis" else s
+        for sid, s in (ctx.data.get("scales") or {}).items()
+    }
+    step = Step(data={"crisis": crisis, "scales": scales})
+    if ctx.state == "crisis":
+        step.next_state = "idle"
+        step.replies.append(Reply(text=ctx.texts.crisis.closed))
+    return step
+
+
+@state("crisis")
+async def _crisis(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    # The NoopMonitoring stub knows nothing about crises and always says "not in crisis"; trusting it would
+    # end every crisis on the next message. Until lane B (#38) lands only `doctor_ack` ends a crisis.
+    if not isinstance(ctx.monitoring, NoopMonitoring) and not await ctx.monitoring.is_in_crisis(ctx.token):
+        return close_crisis(ctx)
+    if event.type == "system":
+        return Step()  # reminders and check-ins wait until the crisis is over
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button == "safety_plan":
+        return Step(replies=[await safety_plan_reply(ctx)])
+    plan = Button(label=ctx.texts.safety_plan.title.rstrip(":"), data="safety_plan")
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.crisis.hold, buttons=[[plan]], kind="crisis")])
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- revocation
+
+
+async def revoke(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    """Withdraw consent in one step (152-FZ art. 9 p. 2): identity DB + dialog state; the bot goes silent.
+
+    Clinical data are marked for deletion (`data["delete_requested"]`) — erasure itself is lane B's job.
+    """
+    async with get_identity_session() as s:
+        await identity_repo.revoke_consent(s, token=ctx.token, now=ctx.now)
+    data = {
+        "consent": False,
+        "revoked_at": ctx.now.isoformat(),
+        "delete_requested": True,
+        "scales": None,
+        "pending_scales": None,
+    }
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.revoked.confirm)], next_state="consent_revoked", data=data)
+
+
+@state("consent_revoked")
+async def _revoked(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    if event.type == "start":
+        return Step(replies=[consent_reply(ctx)], next_state="consent")
+    return Step()  # silent: nothing is processed after revocation

app/dialog/fsm.py

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+"""FSM framework of the dialog engine: context, step result and the state / trigger registries.
+
+States are plain strings, namespaced by module ("veteran.onboarding.pcl5"); core states have short names
+("new", "consent", "age_gate", "idle", "crisis", "consent_revoked", ...). A flow module
+(`app/dialog/flows/<module>.py`) registers its states at import time — the engine never has to be edited to
+add a scenario:
+
+    from app.dialog.fsm import Ctx, Step, on_enter, state
+    from app.dialog.scale_session import start_scale
+
+    @on_enter("veteran.onboarding.start")          # runs when the FSM *enters* the state
+    async def _start(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+        return await start_scale(ctx, "pcptsd5", return_state="veteran.onboarding.pcl5")
+
+    @state("veteran.onboarding.trauma")            # handles events while the FSM *is in* the state
+    async def _trauma(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+        ...
+        return Step(replies=[...], next_state="idle", data={"trauma": True})
+
+Name resolution: an exact registration wins, otherwise the longest registered dotted prefix handles the state
+("scale.phq9" → the generic "scale" handler). Triggers (`@trigger("button:menu:checkin")`,
+`@trigger("system:daily_checkin")`, `@trigger("text:idle")`) let flows take over what the core `idle` state does
+with menu buttons, system events and free text; the core registers defaults, a flow overrides with
+`replace=True`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Any
+
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.core.types import ScrubbedText
+from app.db import repo
+from app.db.clinical import PatientProfile
+from app.dialog.contracts import Event, Reply
+from app.dialog.texts import DialogTexts
+from app.llm.gateway import LLMGateway
+from app.services.contracts import MonitoringService
+
+# States where nothing is being asked: a pending scale may start here (see engine `_start_pending`).
+RESTING_STATES = frozenset({"idle", "crisis"})
+# States without (valid) consent: the engine stores nothing and never calls the LLM here (152-FZ art. 9-10).
+NO_CONSENT_STATES = frozenset({"new", "consent", "refused", "minor", "consent_revoked"})
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Ctx:
+    """Everything a state handler may use. `data` is the persisted `dialog_state.data` (treat as read-only:
+    return changes in `Step.data`, the engine applies them)."""
+
+    token: str
+    state: str
+    data: dict[str, Any]
+    now: datetime  # from app.core.clock, taken once per incoming event (ADR-005)
+    session: AsyncSession  # clinical DB unit of work of this event
+    gateway: LLMGateway
+    monitoring: MonitoringService
+    texts: DialogTexts
+    text: ScrubbedText | None = None  # scrubbed patient text for text events — the only text handlers see
+    _profile: PatientProfile | None = field(default=None, repr=False)
+    _profile_loaded: bool = field(default=False, repr=False)
+
+    async def profile(self) -> PatientProfile | None:
+        if not self._profile_loaded:
+            self._profile = await repo.get_profile(self.session, self.token)
+            self._profile_loaded = True
+        return self._profile
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Step:
+    """Result of a handler.
+
+    replies          — messages to send, in order;
+    next_state       — new FSM state (None = stay); entering a different state runs its `@on_enter` hook;
+    data             — updates merged into `dialog_state.data` (a value of None deletes the key);
+    notify_monitoring — the handler wrote clinical data: the engine commits and calls
+                       `MonitoringService.after_data_change()`, then executes the returned dialog actions.
+    """
+
+    replies: list[Reply] = field(default_factory=list)
+    next_state: str | None = None
+    data: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    notify_monitoring: bool = False
+
+    def then(self, other: Step) -> Step:
+        """Sequential composition: replies concatenated, later state/data win."""
+        return Step(
+            replies=[*self.replies, *other.replies],
+            next_state=other.next_state or self.next_state,
+            data={**self.data, **other.data},
+            notify_monitoring=self.notify_monitoring or other.notify_monitoring,
+        )
+
+
+Handler = Callable[[Ctx, Event], Awaitable[Step]]
+EnterHook = Callable[[Ctx], Awaitable[Step]]
+
+_handlers: dict[str, Handler] = {}
+_enter_hooks: dict[str, EnterHook] = {}
+_triggers: dict[str, Handler] = {}
+
+
+def state(name: str) -> Callable[[Handler], Handler]:
+    """Register the event handler of state `name` (or of a dotted prefix, e.g. "scale")."""
+
+    def deco(fn: Handler) -> Handler:
+        if name in _handlers:
+            raise ValueError(f"state '{name}' already registered")
+        _handlers[name] = fn
+        return fn
+
+    return deco
+
+
+def on_enter(name: str) -> Callable[[EnterHook], EnterHook]:
+    """Register a hook that runs when the FSM enters state `name` (asks the first question, chains flows)."""
+
+    def deco(fn: EnterHook) -> EnterHook:
+        if name in _enter_hooks:
+            raise ValueError(f"enter hook of '{name}' already registered")
+        _enter_hooks[name] = fn
+        return fn
+
+    return deco
+
+
+def trigger(key: str, *, replace: bool = False) -> Callable[[Handler], Handler]:
+    """Register a handler for an idle-menu button / system event / idle free text.
+
+    Keys: "button:<Button.data>", "system:<SystemEventKind>", "text:idle". The core registers defaults;
+    flows pass `replace=True` to take one over.
+    """
+
+    def deco(fn: Handler) -> Handler:
+        if key in _triggers and not replace:
+            raise ValueError(f"trigger '{key}' already registered (use replace=True to override)")
+        _triggers[key] = fn
+        return fn
+
+    return deco
+
+
+def _resolve(name: str, table: dict[str, Any]) -> str | None:
+    candidate = name
+    while candidate:
+        if candidate in table:
+            return candidate
+        if "." not in candidate:
+            return None
+        candidate = candidate.rsplit(".", 1)[0]
+    return None
+
+
+def handler_for(name: str) -> Handler | None:
+    key = _resolve(name, _handlers)
+    return _handlers[key] if key else None
+
+
+def enter_hook_for(name: str) -> EnterHook | None:
+    key = _resolve(name, _enter_hooks)
+    return _enter_hooks[key] if key else None
+
+
+def get_trigger(key: str) -> Handler | None:
+    return _triggers.get(key)
+
+
+def is_registered(name: str) -> bool:
+    """Exact registration (handler or enter hook) — used to find a module's onboarding entry point."""
+    return name in _handlers or name in _enter_hooks
+
+
+def apply_data(data: dict[str, Any], updates: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    for key, value in updates.items():
+        if value is None:
+            data.pop(key, None)
+        else:
+            data[key] = value

app/dialog/scale_session.py

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+"""Reusable scale session: asks a questionnaire item by item inside the dialog (SPEC §6 "Сбор шкалы в диалоге").
+
+Usage from a flow (#36/#37):
+
+    step = await start_scale(ctx, "pcl5", return_state="veteran.onboarding.phq9", scheduled=True)
+    return step  # FSM goes to "scale.pcl5"; its enter hook asks item 1; on completion → return_state
+
+Algorithm per item:
+  1. The item is shown with one button per answer option from `config/scales/<id>.yaml`.
+  2. A button press is taken as is (source="button").
+  3. Free text is accepted only for items without `buttons_only` (PHQ-9 item 9 and the whole C-SSRS are
+     buttons-only: suicidal-ideation answers are never interpreted by the LLM — SPEC §6, ADR-002). The scrubbed
+     text goes to `gateway.extract_item`; `None` (failure / confidence < 0.5 / out-of-range score) → a clarifying
+     question with the same buttons, nothing is stored (source="llm" only for a confident extraction).
+  4. Every answer is stored immediately (`item_responses`), so a session interrupted by a crisis keeps its data.
+  5. After each answer the scale is scored deterministically (`app.core.scales.score`). If a crisis flag from
+     `config/texts/dialog.yaml: settings.crisis_flags` fires (PHQ-9 item 9 ≥ 1, C-SSRS high) the session ends at
+     once: partial result saved, fixed crisis script, C-SSRS queued (unless this *is* the C-SSRS). A positive
+     item 9 is acted upon even in a half-finished questionnaire.
+  6. On completion: `scale_results` row (total, severity, item 9, scheduled flag, flags) → the engine commits
+     and calls `MonitoringService.after_data_change()` (rules decide alerts — ADR-007) → back to `return_state`.
+The patient never sees a score or a severity label: that would read as a diagnosis.
+"""
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from app.core.privacy import scrub
+from app.core.scales import Item, ScaleDef, ScaleResult, load_scale, score
+from app.db import repo
+from app.dialog.contracts import Button, Event, Reply
+from app.dialog.crisis import crisis_open, open_crisis
+from app.dialog.fsm import Ctx, Step, on_enter, state
+
+PREFIX = "scale"
+
+
+def scale_state(scale_id: str) -> str:
+    return f"{PREFIX}.{scale_id}"
+
+
+def active_scale(state_name: str) -> str | None:
+    return state_name.split(".", 1)[1] if state_name.startswith(PREFIX + ".") else None
+
+
+def add_pending(data: dict[str, Any], scale_id: str, scheduled: bool) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Queue a scale to start at the next resting state (idle/crisis); duplicates are ignored."""
+    pending = list(data.get("pending_scales") or [])
+    if scale_id not in {p["scale"] for p in pending}:
+        pending.append({"scale": scale_id, "scheduled": scheduled})
+    return pending
+
+
+async def start_scale(
+    ctx: Ctx, scale_id: str, *, return_state: str, scheduled: bool = True, intro: str | None = None
+) -> Step:
+    """Begin a session of `scale_id`; returns a Step moving the FSM to `scale.<id>`.
+
+    `scheduled=False` marks an unscheduled administration (triggered by a rule or a safety signal).
+    `intro` — optional extra text shown before the scale instruction.
+    """
+    scale = load_scale(scale_id)  # fail fast on an unknown id
+    sessions = dict(ctx.data.get("scales") or {})
+    sessions[scale_id] = {
+        "idx": 0,
+        "answers": {},
+        "return_state": return_state,
+        "scheduled": scheduled,
+        "intro": intro,
+        "intro_shown": False,
+    }
+    target = scale_state(scale_id)
+    if ctx.state == target:  # restart in place: the enter hook would not run
+        sessions[scale_id]["intro_shown"] = True
+        return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, sessions[scale_id], intro=True)], data={"scales": sessions})
+    return Step(next_state=target, data={"scales": sessions})
+
+
+def _question(ctx: Ctx, scale: ScaleDef, session: dict[str, Any], *, intro: bool = False, note: str = "") -> Reply:
+    idx = session["idx"]
+    item = scale.items[idx]
+    parts: list[str] = []
+    if note:
+        parts.append(note)
+    if intro:
+        if session.get("intro"):
+            parts.append(session["intro"])
+        parts.append(ctx.texts.scale.intro.format(count=len(scale.items), instruction=scale.instruction or "").strip())
+    parts.append(ctx.texts.scale.question.format(n=idx + 1, total=len(scale.items), text=item.text))
+    buttons = [[Button(label=o.label, data=f"{PREFIX}:{scale.id}:{item.id}:{o.value}")] for o in item.options]
+    return Reply(text="\n\n".join(parts), buttons=buttons, kind="question")
+
+
+def _session(ctx: Ctx) -> tuple[ScaleDef, dict[str, Any]] | None:
+    scale_id = active_scale(ctx.state)
+    session = (ctx.data.get("scales") or {}).get(scale_id) if scale_id else None
+    if scale_id is None or session is None:
+        return None
+    return load_scale(scale_id), session
+
+
+@on_enter(PREFIX)
+async def _enter(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    found = _session(ctx)
+    if found is None:
+        return Step(next_state="idle")
+    scale, session = found
+    show_intro = session["idx"] == 0 and not session.get("intro_shown")
+    updated = {**session, "intro_shown": True}
+    sessions = {**(ctx.data.get("scales") or {}), scale.id: updated}
+    return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, updated, intro=show_intro)], data={"scales": sessions})
+
+
+def _parse_button(data: str, scale: ScaleDef, item: Item) -> int | None:
+    parts = data.split(":")
+    if len(parts) != 4 or parts[0] != PREFIX or parts[1] != scale.id or parts[2] != item.id:
+        return None  # stale button from an earlier question
+    try:
+        value = int(parts[3])
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return value if value in {o.value for o in item.options} else None
+
+
+@state(PREFIX)
+async def _handle(ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
+    found = _session(ctx)
+    if found is None:
+        return Step(next_state="idle")
+    scale, session = found
+    item = scale.items[session["idx"]]
+
+    if event.type == "button" and event.button:
+        value = _parse_button(event.button, scale, item)
+        if value is not None:
+            return await _record(ctx, scale, session, item, value, source="button")
+        return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, session)])
+
+    if event.type == "text" and ctx.text is not None:
+        if item.buttons_only:
+            # Safety items are never LLM-interpreted: ask again for a button.
+            return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, session, note=ctx.texts.scale.buttons_only)])
+        extracted = await ctx.gateway.extract_item(item.id, item.text, item.max_value, ctx.text)
+        if extracted is None or extracted.score not in {o.value for o in item.options}:
+            return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, session, note=ctx.texts.scale.clarify)])
+        return await _record(
+            ctx,
+            scale,
+            session,
+            item,
+            extracted.score,
+            source="llm",
+            confidence=extracted.confidence,
+            evidence=extracted.evidence,
+        )
+
+    if event.type == "system":
+        return Step()  # reminders etc. do not interrupt a questionnaire
+    return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, session)])
+
+
+async def _record(
+    ctx: Ctx,
+    scale: ScaleDef,
+    session: dict[str, Any],
+    item: Item,
+    value: int,
+    *,
+    source: str,
+    confidence: float | None = None,
+    evidence: str = "",
+) -> Step:
+    await repo.add_item_response(
+        ctx.session,
+        token=ctx.token,
+        scale=scale.id,
+        item_id=item.id,
+        score=value,
+        source=source,
+        ts=ctx.now,
+        confidence=confidence,
+        # Evidence is a quote of already scrubbed text; scrub again so nothing unscrubbed can be stored.
+        evidence=scrub(evidence) if evidence else None,
+    )
+    answers = {**session["answers"], item.id: value}
+    profile = await ctx.profile()
+    sex = profile.sex if profile is not None and profile.sex in ("m", "f") else None
+    result = score(scale.id, answers, sex=sex)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    crisis_flags = [f for f in result.flags if f in ctx.texts.settings.crisis_flags]
+    if crisis_flags or session["idx"] + 1 >= len(scale.items):
+        return await _finish(ctx, scale, session, answers, result, crisis_flags)
+    updated = {**session, "answers": answers, "idx": session["idx"] + 1}
+    sessions = {**(ctx.data.get("scales") or {}), scale.id: updated}
+    return Step(replies=[_question(ctx, scale, updated)], data={"scales": sessions})
+
+
+async def _finish(
+    ctx: Ctx,
+    scale: ScaleDef,
+    session: dict[str, Any],
+    answers: dict[str, int],
+    result: ScaleResult,
+    crisis_flags: list[str],
+) -> Step:
+    await repo.add_scale_result(
+        ctx.session,
+        token=ctx.token,
+        scale=scale.id,
+        total=result.total,
+        severity=result.severity_code,
+        complete=result.complete,
+        ts=ctx.now,
+        # PHQ-9 item 9 is stored separately: any value >= 1 escalates regardless of the total.
+        item9=answers.get("phq9_9") if scale.id == "phq9" else None,
+        scheduled=bool(session.get("scheduled", True)),
+        flags={f: True for f in result.flags},
+    )
+    sessions = {k: v for k, v in (ctx.data.get("scales") or {}).items() if k != scale.id}
+    done = Step(
+        replies=[Reply(text=ctx.texts.scale.done)],
+        next_state=session["return_state"],
+        data={"scales": sessions},
+        notify_monitoring=True,
+    )
+    if not crisis_flags:
+        return done
+
+    # Crisis path decided by the scale's own flags (deterministic), not by the LLM.
+    risk_screen = ctx.texts.settings.risk_screen_scale
+    if crisis_open(ctx.data):
+        crisis = Step(next_state="crisis")
+    else:
+        crisis = open_crisis(ctx, categories=[], source=f"scale:{scale.id}")
+    step = done.then(crisis)
+    if scale.id != risk_screen:
+        step.data["pending_scales"] = add_pending(ctx.data, risk_screen, scheduled=False)
+    return step

app/dialog/texts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+"""Patient-facing dialog texts from `config/texts/dialog.yaml` (ADR-008: texts live in config, not code)."""
+
+from functools import lru_cache
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+
+from app.config import get_settings
+
+
+class _Strict(BaseModel):
+    # A typo in a YAML key must fail at load time, not silently show an empty message to a patient.
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid", frozen=True)
+
+
+class DialogSettings(_Strict):
+    cssrs_cooldown_hours: float = 24
+    max_safety_events: int = 50
+    crisis_flags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    risk_screen_scale: str = "cssrs_screen"
+
+
+class Commands(_Strict):
+    revoke: list[str]
+
+
+class ConsentTexts(_Strict):
+    version: str
+    text: str
+    accept: str
+    decline: str
+    refused: str
+    reconsider: str
+    code_invalid: str
+
+
+class AgeGateTexts(_Strict):
+    question: str
+    adult: str
+    minor: str
+    unclear: str
+    minor_stop: str
+
+
+class IdleButtons(_Strict):
+    checkin: str
+    med_question: str
+    contact_doctor: str
+    revoke: str
+
+
+class IdleTexts(_Strict):
+    welcome: str
+    menu_prompt: str
+    buttons: IdleButtons
+    stub_checkin: str
+    stub_med_question: str
+    contact_doctor_ack: str
+    visit_stub: str
+
+
+class RevokedTexts(_Strict):
+    confirm: str
+
+
+class CrisisTexts(_Strict):
+    repeat: str
+    hold: str
+    closed: str
+
+
+class ScaleTexts(_Strict):
+    intro: str
+    question: str
+    clarify: str
+    buttons_only: str
+    done: str
+    risk_screen_intro: str
+
+
+class SafetyPlanTexts(_Strict):
+    title: str
+    template: list[str]
+    means_restriction: str
+
+
+class ReachOutTexts(_Strict):
+    silence: str
+    missed_doses: str
+    default: str
+
+
+class VisitTexts(_Strict):
+    button: str
+
+
+class DialogTexts(_Strict):
+    status: str
+    settings: DialogSettings
+    commands: Commands
+    consent: ConsentTexts
+    age_gate: AgeGateTexts
+    idle: IdleTexts
+    revoked: RevokedTexts
+    crisis: CrisisTexts
+    scale: ScaleTexts
+    safety_plan: SafetyPlanTexts
+    reach_out: ReachOutTexts
+    visit: VisitTexts
+    unavailable: str
+
+
+def dialog_texts_path() -> Path:
+    return get_settings().config_dir / "texts" / "dialog.yaml"
+
+
+@lru_cache
+def load_dialog_texts(path: Path | None = None) -> DialogTexts:
+    path = path or dialog_texts_path()
+    return DialogTexts.model_validate(yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))

config/texts/dialog.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# Тексты диалогового движка (issue #10): согласие, возраст, меню, кризис, шкалы, отзыв согласия.
+# СТАТУС: черновик, утверждает психиатр (#8).
+#
+# Правила текстов: без диагнозов и названий расстройств; без советов по дозам; не обещать конфиденциальность
+# сверх реальной; не использовать слова «учёт», «контроль», «психиатрический надзор» (проверяется тестом).
+# Кризисный скрипт — в crisis.yaml (отправляется дословно, LLM не вызывается).
+
+status: "черновик, утверждает психиатр (#8)"
+
+settings:
+  # Повторный C-SSRS по сигналу POSSIBLE не чаще, чем раз в N часов (сигнал всё равно пишется в safety_events).
+  cssrs_cooldown_hours: 24
+  # Сколько последних safety-событий хранить в dialog_state.data["safety_events"].
+  max_safety_events: 50
+  # Флаги шкал (config/scales/*.yaml), при которых сессия шкалы сразу уходит в кризисный путь.
+  crisis_flags: [phq9_item9_positive, cssrs_high]
+  # Шкала-скрининг суицидального риска (POSSIBLE и положительный п.9 PHQ-9 → эта шкала).
+  risk_screen_scale: cssrs_screen
+
+commands:
+  # Текстовые команды отзыва согласия (сравниваются после приведения к нижнему регистру).
+  revoke: ["/revoke", "отозвать согласие", "отзываю согласие"]
+
+consent:
+  version: "v1-draft-2026-10-03"
+  text: |-
+    Здравствуйте! Я — цифровой помощник, который сопровождает вас между визитами к врачу: напоминаю о приёме препарата, спрашиваю о самочувствии и передаю важное вашему лечащему врачу.
+
+    Прежде чем начать, мне нужно ваше согласие на обработку персональных данных, в том числе сведений о здоровье (152-ФЗ «О персональных данных», ст. 9 и 10).
+
+    • Что обрабатывается: ваши ответы о самочувствии, сне, приёме препарата и результаты коротких опросников. Перед автоматической обработкой из сообщений удаляются имена, телефоны и другие личные данные.
+    • Кто видит данные: только ваш лечащий врач. Данные хранятся в России и не передаются третьим лицам без вашего согласия, кроме случаев, прямо предусмотренных законом.
+    • Я не ставлю диагнозов и не заменяю врача. Решения о лечении принимает только врач.
+    • Участие добровольное. Отказ никак не влияет на вашу медицинскую помощь.
+    • Отозвать согласие можно в любой момент в один шаг: кнопкой «Отозвать согласие» или командой /revoke.
+
+    Я не служба экстренной помощи. Если вам угрожает опасность прямо сейчас — звоните 112.
+  accept: "Согласен(на)"
+  decline: "Не согласен(на)"
+  refused: |-
+    Понимаю, это ваше право. Без согласия я не обрабатываю и не сохраняю ваши сообщения. Ваше лечение у врача продолжается как обычно.
+    Если передумаете — нажмите кнопку ниже или отправьте /start.
+  reconsider: "Я передумал(а)"
+  code_invalid: "Код подключения не найден или уже использован. Пожалуйста, уточните код у вашего врача и отправьте его ещё раз."
+
+age_gate:
+  question: "Уточните, пожалуйста: вам уже исполнилось 18 лет? Можно нажать кнопку или написать год рождения (например, 1990)."
+  adult: "Да, мне 18 или больше"
+  minor: "Нет, мне меньше 18"
+  unclear: "Не удалось понять ответ. Нажмите кнопку или напишите год рождения четырьмя цифрами, например 1990."
+  minor_stop: |-
+    Спасибо, что ответили. Этот помощник рассчитан на взрослых, поэтому дальше я не смогу с вами работать и не сохраняю ваши ответы.
+    Если вам тяжело или нужна поддержка — позвоните на Детский телефон доверия 8-800-2000-122 (бесплатно, анонимно, круглосуточно) или расскажите взрослому, которому доверяете: родителям, учителю, школьному психологу.
+    Если есть угроза жизни прямо сейчас — звоните 112.
+
+idle:
+  welcome: |-
+    Спасибо, всё готово! Я буду на связи каждый день: напомню о препарате и спрошу о самочувствии. Если захотите что-то рассказать — просто напишите или выберите кнопку ниже.
+  menu_prompt: "Чем могу помочь?"
+  buttons:
+    checkin: "Как я сегодня"
+    med_question: "Вопрос о лекарстве"
+    contact_doctor: "Связаться с врачом"
+    revoke: "Отозвать согласие"
+  # Заглушки кнопок меню; ветки ветерана (#36/#37) и med_qa (#15) подменяют их своими триггерами.
+  stub_checkin: "Короткий опрос о самочувствии скоро появится здесь. А пока можно просто написать, как вы себя чувствуете сегодня."
+  stub_med_question: "Напишите ваш вопрос о препарате. Я отвечаю только по официальной инструкции, а если ответа в ней нет — передам вопрос врачу."
+  contact_doctor_ack: "Я отметил вашу просьбу связаться с врачом — она появится в вашей карточке у врача. Если ситуация срочная, звоните 112."
+  visit_stub: "Онлайн-запись появится здесь позже. Пока вы можете записаться к своему врачу через регистратуру клиники."
+
+revoked:
+  confirm: |-
+    Согласие отозвано. Я больше не буду писать вам и обрабатывать ваши сообщения, а ваши данные помечены к удалению.
+    Если передумаете — отправьте /start. Если вам угрожает опасность — звоните 112.
+
+crisis:
+  # Повторный острый сигнал в уже открытом кризисе: скрипт второй раз не шлём, только это + ресурсы.
+  repeat: "Я рядом. Ваш врач уже уведомлён. Если вам угрожает опасность прямо сейчас — позвоните:"
+  # Любое другое сообщение, пока кризис открыт (до подтверждения врача).
+  hold: "Я на связи и читаю вас. Ваш врач в курсе и свяжется с вами. Если станет хуже — звоните 112 или на телефон доверия 8-800-2000-122."
+  # Врач подтвердил кризисный алерт (doctor_ack): выходим из кризиса.
+  closed: "Ваш врач получил сообщение и в курсе вашей ситуации. Спасибо, что остаётесь на связи. Если снова станет тяжело — напишите мне в любой момент."
+
+scale:
+  intro: "Несколько коротких вопросов ({count}). {instruction}"
+  question: "{n}/{total}. {text}"
+  clarify: "Не совсем понял ответ. Выберите, пожалуйста, вариант кнопкой или опишите, как часто это было."
+  buttons_only: "На этот вопрос, пожалуйста, ответьте кнопкой."
+  done: "Спасибо, ответы сохранены. Ваш врач увидит результаты."
+  risk_screen_intro: "Спасибо, что поделились. Мне важно задать несколько коротких вопросов, чтобы лучше понять, как вы сейчас."
+
+safety_plan:
+  title: "Ваш план безопасности:"
+  # Шаблон Стэнли–Брауна, если план ещё не составлен с врачом на визите.
+  template:
+    - "Мои тревожные сигналы: что я замечаю, когда становится хуже."
+    - "Что помогает мне самому: прогулка, душ, дыхание, любимое дело."
+    - "Люди и места, которые отвлекают: к кому можно пойти."
+    - "Кому позвонить, если тяжело: близкий человек, сослуживец."
+    - "Специалисты: ваш врач, телефон доверия 8-800-2000-122, экстренные службы 112."
+    - "Безопасная среда: оружие и лишние лекарства — на хранение близкому человеку."
+  means_restriction: "Если дома есть оружие или запас лекарств — попросите близкого человека временно хранить их у себя."
+
+reach_out:
+  silence: "Давно не было вестей от вас. Как вы? Можно ответить одним словом — мне важно знать, что с вами всё в порядке."
+  missed_doses: "Заметил, что несколько приёмов препарата пропущено. Всё ли в порядке? Если что-то мешает — расскажите, я передам врачу."
+  default: "Хотел узнать, как вы. Напишите пару слов, когда будет удобно."
+
+visit:
+  button: "Записаться к врачу раньше"
+
+unavailable: |-
+  Сейчас у меня технические неполадки, и я не могу сохранить ваше сообщение. Пожалуйста, напишите чуть позже.
+  Если вам плохо прямо сейчас — звоните 112 или на телефон доверия 8-800-2000-122.

tests/test_dialog_engine.py

@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+"""Dialog engine (#10): consent, age gate, crisis without LLM, C-SSRS on POSSIBLE, scale sessions, revocation.
+
+Two in-memory SQLite databases (identity / clinical), offline mock LLM wrapped in a spy that records every task
+call, and a fake monitoring service (lane B stub) that records calls and returns scripted actions.
+"""
+
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy import select
+
+from app.config import get_settings
+from app.core import clock
+from app.core.rules import Action
+from app.core.safety import crisis_reply
+from app.core.types import AlertLevel, ScrubbedText
+from app.db import identity_repo, repo, session
+from app.db.bootstrap import init_db
+from app.db.clinical import ItemResponse, Message, SafetyPlan
+from app.dialog.contracts import Event, Reply, get_engine
+from app.dialog.engine import Engine
+from app.dialog.fsm import Ctx, Step, on_enter
+from app.dialog.texts import load_dialog_texts
+from app.integrations.base import VerifiedPerson, integrations
+from app.llm.gateway import LLMGateway
+from app.llm.mock import MockTasks
+from app.llm.schemas import RiskVerdict
+
+TOKEN = "a" * 32
+TEXTS = load_dialog_texts()
+MEM = "sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:"
+
+
+class SpyTasks(MockTasks):
+    """Offline mock that records which LLM tasks were called (to prove the crisis path never calls the LLM)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, risk: str | None = None) -> None:
+        self.calls: list[str] = []
+        self._risk = risk
+
+    async def extract_item(self, scale_item_id: str, item_text: str, max_score: int, answer: ScrubbedText) -> Any:
+        self.calls.append("extract_item")
+        return await super().extract_item(scale_item_id, item_text, max_score, answer)
+
+    async def extract_checkin(self, text: ScrubbedText) -> Any:
+        self.calls.append("extract_checkin")
+        return await super().extract_checkin(text)
+
+    async def risk_classify(self, text: ScrubbedText) -> RiskVerdict | None:
+        self.calls.append("risk_classify")
+        if self._risk is not None:
+            return RiskVerdict(level=self._risk, confidence=0.9)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        return await super().risk_classify(text)
+
+    async def phrase(self, intent: str, payload: ScrubbedText, base_text: str) -> str | None:
+        self.calls.append("phrase")
+        return base_text
+
+
+class FakeMonitoring:
+    def __init__(self, actions: list[Action] | None = None, in_crisis: bool = True) -> None:
+        self.calls = 0
+        self.actions = actions or []
+        self.in_crisis = in_crisis
+
+    async def after_data_change(self, token: str) -> list[Action]:
+        self.calls += 1
+        out, self.actions = self.actions, []
+        return out
+
+    async def is_in_crisis(self, token: str) -> bool:
+        return self.in_crisis
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+async def dbs() -> AsyncIterator[None]:
+    await session.configure(identity_url=MEM, clinical_url=MEM)
+    await init_db()
+    async with session.get_identity_session() as s:
+        await identity_repo.create_patient(
+            s,
+            token=TOKEN,
+            display_name="Тестовый Пациент",
+            snils="000-000-000 00",
+            clinic_id="c1",
+            doctor_id="doc-test",
+            now=clock.now(),
+            birth_year=1992,
+            sex="m",
+        )
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        await repo.upsert_profile(s, token=TOKEN, doctor_id="doc-test", modules=[], sex="m")
+    yield
+    await session.configure()  # back to default URLs for other test modules
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def spy() -> SpyTasks:
+    return SpyTasks()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def mon() -> FakeMonitoring:
+    return FakeMonitoring()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def engine(spy: SpyTasks, mon: FakeMonitoring) -> Engine:
+    return Engine(gateway=LLMGateway(spy), monitoring=mon)
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- helpers
+
+
+async def text(e: Engine, t: str) -> list[Reply]:
+    return await e.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="text", text=t))
+
+
+async def press(e: Engine, data: str) -> list[Reply]:
+    return await e.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="button", button=data))
+
+
+async def system(e: Engine, kind: str, **params: Any) -> list[Reply]:
+    return await e.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="system", system=kind, params=params))  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+
+async def set_state(state: str, **data: Any) -> None:
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        await repo.set_dialog_state(s, token=TOKEN, state=state, data={"consent": True, **data}, now=clock.now())
+
+
+async def get_state() -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        row = await repo.get_dialog_state(s, TOKEN)
+        assert row is not None
+        return row.state, dict(row.data)
+
+
+async def stored_messages() -> list[Message]:
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        return list((await s.scalars(select(Message).where(Message.token == TOKEN).order_by(Message.id))).all())
+
+
+async def identity_patient() -> Any:
+    async with session.get_identity_session() as s:
+        return await identity_repo.get_patient(s, TOKEN)
+
+
+async def set_birth_year(year: int | None) -> None:
+    async with session.get_identity_session() as s:
+        patient = await identity_repo.get_patient(s, TOKEN)
+        assert patient is not None
+        patient.birth_year = year
+
+
+def buttons(reply: Reply) -> list[str]:
+    return [b.data for row in reply.buttons for b in row]
+
+
+# A fake module onboarding entry point, to check the hand-over without depending on #36.
+@on_enter("zztest.onboarding.start")
+async def _zz_onboarding(ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
+    return Step(replies=[Reply(text="zz onboarding")])
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- registration
+
+
+async def test_get_engine_returns_real_engine() -> None:
+    assert isinstance(get_engine(), Engine)
+
+
+async def test_consent_accept_goes_to_idle(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    r = await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start"))
+    assert "152-ФЗ" in r[0].text and buttons(r[0]) == ["consent:yes", "consent:no"]
+    assert (await get_state())[0] == "consent"
+
+    r = await press(engine, "consent:yes")
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    # Birth year 1992 is known from registration → adult without asking; no module flow → idle.
+    assert state == "idle" and data["consent"] is True
+    assert r[-1].text.startswith(TEXTS.idle.welcome[:20]) and "consent:revoke" in buttons(r[-1])
+    patient = await identity_patient()
+    assert patient.consent_at is not None and patient.consent_ver == TEXTS.consent.version
+
+
+async def test_connect_code_verified(dbs: None, engine: Engine, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    class Ident:
+        async def verify(self, auth_code: str) -> VerifiedPerson | None:
+            return VerifiedPerson(token=TOKEN, doctor_id="doc-test") if auth_code == "GOOD" else None
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(integrations, "identity", Ident())
+    r = await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start", params={"code": "BAD"}))
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.consent.code_invalid and (await get_state())[0] == "new"
+    r = await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start", params={"code": "GOOD"}))
+    assert buttons(r[0]) == ["consent:yes", "consent:no"]
+
+
+async def test_consent_refused_no_processing(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start"))
+    r = await press(engine, "consent:no")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.consent.refused and (await get_state())[0] == "refused"
+    r = await text(engine, "мне плохо, не сплю, позвоните 89161234567")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.consent.refused
+    assert spy.calls == []  # nothing reached the LLM
+    assert await stored_messages() == []  # nothing stored without consent
+    assert (await identity_patient()).consent_at is None
+    r = await press(engine, "consent:restart")
+    assert buttons(r[0]) == ["consent:yes", "consent:no"]
+
+
+async def test_minor_gets_child_helpline_and_stop(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await set_birth_year(None)
+    await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start"))
+    r = await press(engine, "consent:yes")
+    assert buttons(r[-1]) == ["age:adult", "age:minor"]
+    r = await text(engine, "2012")
+    assert "8-800-2000-122" in r[0].text
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "minor" and data["consent"] is False
+    assert (await identity_patient()).revoked_at is not None  # a minor's consent is withdrawn
+    calls = len(spy.calls)
+    r = await text(engine, "а что дальше?")
+    assert "8-800-2000-122" in r[0].text and len(spy.calls) == calls
+
+
+async def test_age_gate_button_adult(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    await set_birth_year(None)
+    await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start"))
+    await press(engine, "consent:yes")
+    r = await text(engine, "не скажу")
+    assert r[0].text.startswith(TEXTS.age_gate.unclear)
+    await press(engine, "age:adult")
+    assert (await get_state())[0] == "idle"
+
+
+async def test_hand_over_to_module_onboarding(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        await repo.upsert_profile(s, token=TOKEN, modules=["zztest"])
+    await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start"))
+    r = await press(engine, "consent:yes")
+    assert r[-1].text == "zz onboarding"
+    assert (await get_state())[0] == "zztest.onboarding.start"
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- safety
+
+
+async def test_acute_sends_script_without_any_llm_call(
+    dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks, mon: FakeMonitoring
+) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await text(engine, "хочу покончить с собой")
+    assert len(r) == 1 and r[0].kind == "crisis"
+    assert r[0].text == crisis_reply(["suicide"]).text  # verbatim fixed script
+    assert spy.calls == []  # lexicon ACUTE → risk_classify is not even called
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "crisis" and data["crisis"]["open"] is True
+    event = data["safety_events"][-1]
+    assert event["level"] == "acute" and event["categories"] == ["suicide"] and event["handled"] == "crisis_script"
+    assert mon.calls == 1  # lane B gets the chance to escalate
+
+
+async def test_repeat_crisis_does_not_duplicate_script(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    script = (await text(engine, "хочу покончить с собой"))[0].text
+    r = await text(engine, "не хочу жить")
+    assert r[0].kind == "crisis" and r[0].text != script
+    assert r[0].text.startswith(TEXTS.crisis.repeat) and "112" in r[0].text
+    assert spy.calls == []
+    r = await text(engine, "ладно")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.crisis.hold
+    _, data = await get_state()
+    assert [e["handled"] for e in data["safety_events"]] == ["crisis_script", "crisis_repeat"]
+
+
+async def test_doctor_ack_leaves_crisis(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    await text(engine, "хочу покончить с собой")
+    r = await system(engine, "doctor_ack")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.crisis.closed
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "idle" and data["crisis"]["open"] is False
+    # A new acute message after the crisis was closed gets the full script again.
+    r = await text(engine, "хочу покончить с собой")
+    assert r[0].text == crisis_reply(["suicide"]).text
+
+
+async def test_crisis_left_when_monitoring_says_resolved(dbs: None, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    mon = FakeMonitoring(in_crisis=False)
+    e = Engine(gateway=LLMGateway(spy), monitoring=mon)
+    await set_state("crisis", crisis={"open": True})
+    r = await text(e, "мне получше")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.crisis.closed and (await get_state())[0] == "idle"
+
+
+async def test_possible_starts_cssrs_and_returns(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await text(engine, "всё бессмысленно, устал от всего")
+    assert "risk_classify" in spy.calls
+    assert (await get_state())[0] == "scale.cssrs_screen"
+    assert r[-1].kind == "question" and [b.label for row in r[-1].buttons for b in row] == ["Нет", "Да"]
+    assert TEXTS.scale.risk_screen_intro in r[-1].text
+
+    r = await text(engine, "нет")  # C-SSRS is buttons-only: free text is never sent to extract_item
+    assert r[0].text.startswith(TEXTS.scale.buttons_only) and "extract_item" not in spy.calls
+
+    for i in range(1, 7):
+        r = await press(engine, f"scale:cssrs_screen:cssrs_{i}:0")
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "idle" and "cssrs_screen" not in data.get("scales", {})
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.scale.done
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        (res,) = await repo.list_scale_results(s, TOKEN, "cssrs_screen")
+    assert res.severity == "none" and res.scheduled is False and res.complete
+    assert data["safety_events"][-1]["handled"] == "risk_screen"
+
+
+async def test_cssrs_high_goes_to_crisis(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    await text(engine, "всё бессмысленно, устал от всего")
+    await press(engine, "scale:cssrs_screen:cssrs_1:1")
+    await press(engine, "scale:cssrs_screen:cssrs_2:1")
+    await press(engine, "scale:cssrs_screen:cssrs_3:0")
+    r = await press(engine, "scale:cssrs_screen:cssrs_4:1")  # intent → high: the session ends at once
+    assert any(x.kind == "crisis" and x.text == crisis_reply([]).text for x in r)
+    assert (await get_state())[0] == "crisis"
+
+
+async def test_llm_signal_can_raise_risk(dbs: None, mon: FakeMonitoring) -> None:
+    spy = SpyTasks(risk="possible")
+    e = Engine(gateway=LLMGateway(spy), monitoring=mon)
+    await set_state("idle")
+    await text(e, "обычный день")  # lexicon NONE, LLM says possible → max() = POSSIBLE
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "scale.cssrs_screen" and data["safety_events"][-1]["source"] == "llm"
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- scale session
+
+
+async def test_scale_session_buttons_free_text_and_clarify(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await system(engine, "scale_due", scale="phq9", scheduled=True)
+    assert (await get_state())[0] == "scale.phq9"
+    assert r[0].kind == "question" and len(buttons(r[0])) == 4 and "1/9" in r[0].text
+
+    await press(engine, "scale:phq9:phq9_1:1")
+    r = await text(engine, "почти каждый день")  # mock extract: confident score 3
+    assert "3/9" in r[0].text
+    r = await text(engine, "ну такое")  # no cue → low confidence → clarify, nothing stored
+    assert r[0].text.startswith(TEXTS.scale.clarify) and "3/9" in r[0].text
+    r = await press(engine, "scale:phq9:phq9_1:2")  # stale button from an earlier question → re-ask
+    assert "3/9" in r[0].text
+    for i in range(3, 9):
+        await press(engine, f"scale:phq9:phq9_{i}:0")
+    r = await text(engine, "нет")  # item 9 is buttons-only
+    assert r[0].text.startswith(TEXTS.scale.buttons_only)
+    assert spy.calls.count("extract_item") == 2
+    r = await press(engine, "scale:phq9:phq9_9:0")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.scale.done and (await get_state())[0] == "idle"
+
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        (res,) = await repo.list_scale_results(s, TOKEN, "phq9")
+        items = (await s.scalars(select(ItemResponse).order_by(ItemResponse.id))).all()
+    assert (res.total, res.item9, res.complete, res.scheduled) == (4, 0, True, True)
+    assert [(i.item_id, i.source) for i in items[:2]] == [("phq9_1", "button"), ("phq9_2", "llm")]
+    assert items[1].score == 3 and items[1].confidence is not None
+
+
+async def test_phq9_item9_positive_crisis_then_cssrs(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    await system(engine, "scale_due", scale="phq9", scheduled=False)
+    for i in range(1, 9):
+        await press(engine, f"scale:phq9:phq9_{i}:0")
+    r = await press(engine, "scale:phq9:phq9_9:2")
+    kinds = [x.kind for x in r]
+    assert "crisis" in kinds and r[kinds.index("crisis")].text == crisis_reply([]).text
+    assert r[-1].kind == "question" and "cssrs" not in r[-1].text  # C-SSRS q1 asked after the script
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "scale.cssrs_screen" and data["crisis"]["open"] is True
+    assert data["scales"]["cssrs_screen"]["return_state"] == "crisis"
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        (res,) = await repo.list_scale_results(s, TOKEN, "phq9")
+    assert res.item9 == 2 and res.scheduled is False and res.flags == {"phq9_item9_positive": True}
+    assert "extract_item" not in spy.calls
+    # A repeated acute phrase during the C-SSRS: short text, no second script, the screen continues.
+    r = await text(engine, "не хочу жить")
+    assert r[0].text.startswith(TEXTS.crisis.repeat) and (await get_state())[0] == "scale.cssrs_screen"
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- monitoring actions
+
+
+async def test_monitoring_actions_executed(dbs: None, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    mon = FakeMonitoring(
+        actions=[
+            Action(type="alert", level=AlertLevel.HIGH, code="x"),
+            Action(type="show_safety_plan", code="phq9_item9"),
+            Action(type="schedule_scale", code="mood_low_3d", params={"scale": "phq9", "scheduled": False}),
+        ]
+    )
+    e = Engine(gateway=LLMGateway(spy), monitoring=mon)
+    async with session.get_clinical_session() as s:
+        s.add(SafetyPlan(token=TOKEN, steps=["Позвонить брату Олегу", "Прогулка"], updated_at=clock.now()))
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await press(e, "menu:contact_doctor")  # records a contact request → monitoring runs
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.idle.contact_doctor_ack
+    plan = next(x for x in r if x.kind == "safety_plan")
+    assert "Позвонить брату Олегу" in plan.text
+    assert r[-1].kind == "question"  # unscheduled PHQ-9 started right away (idle = resting)
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "scale.phq9" and data["scales"]["phq9"]["scheduled"] is False
+    assert data["contact_requests"]
+    # Stored outbound texts are scrubbed (the plan names a relative).
+    assert not any("Олег" in m.text_scrubbed for m in await stored_messages())
+
+
+async def test_suggest_visit_and_med_info_phrased(dbs: None, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    mon = FakeMonitoring(
+        actions=[
+            Action(type="med_info", code="alcohol_3d", params={"topic": "alcohol_interaction"}),
+            Action(type="suggest_visit", code="alcohol_3d", params={"reason": "alcohol"}),
+        ]
+    )
+    e = Engine(gateway=LLMGateway(spy), monitoring=mon)
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await press(e, "menu:contact_doctor")
+    assert any("алкогол" in x.text for x in r) and buttons(r[-1]) == ["menu:visit"]
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ consent revocation, privacy
+
+
+async def test_revoke_consent_then_silence(dbs: None, engine: Engine, spy: SpyTasks) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await press(engine, "consent:revoke")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.revoked.confirm
+    state, data = await get_state()
+    assert state == "consent_revoked" and data["consent"] is False and data["delete_requested"] is True
+    assert (await identity_patient()).revoked_at is not None
+    before = len(await stored_messages())
+    assert await text(engine, "привет, как дела?") == []
+    assert await system(engine, "daily_checkin") == []
+    assert spy.calls == [] and len(await stored_messages()) == before
+    r = await engine.handle(TOKEN, Event(type="start"))  # coming back = asking for consent again
+    assert buttons(r[0]) == ["consent:yes", "consent:no"]
+
+
+async def test_revoke_by_text_command(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await text(engine, "Отозвать согласие")
+    assert r[0].text == TEXTS.revoked.confirm and (await get_state())[0] == "consent_revoked"
+
+
+async def test_messages_stored_scrubbed(dbs: None, engine: Engine) -> None:
+    await set_state("idle")
+    r = await text(engine, "Перезвоните мне на 8 916 123-45-67, сегодня обычный день")
+    assert r and buttons(r[0])  # neutral support reply with the idle menu
+    msgs = await stored_messages()
+    inbound = [m.text_scrubbed for m in msgs if m.direction == "in"]
+    assert inbound and "[PHONE]" in inbound[0]
+    assert not any("123-45-67" in m.text_scrubbed or "916" in m.text_scrubbed for m in msgs)
+    assert any(m.direction == "out" for m in msgs)
+
+
+async def test_db_unavailable_still_answers_crisis(engine: Engine, tmp_path: Any) -> None:
+    await session.configure(identity_url=MEM, clinical_url=f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{tmp_path}/missing/dir/x.db")
+    try:
+        r = await text(engine, "хочу покончить с собой")
+        assert r[0].kind == "crisis" and "112" in r[0].text
+        assert crisis_reply(["suicide"]).doctor_notified not in r[0].text  # nobody could be notified
+        r = await text(engine, "привет")
+        assert r[0].text == TEXTS.unavailable
+    finally:
+        await session.configure()
+
+
+def test_dialog_texts_avoid_forbidden_words() -> None:
+    raw = (get_settings().config_dir / "texts" / "dialog.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8").lower()
+    body = "\n".join(line for line in raw.splitlines() if not line.lstrip().startswith("#"))
+    for word in ("учёт", "учет", "контрол", "надзор", "диагноз:"):
+        assert word not in body
+    assert "152-фз" in body and "8-800-2000-122" in body