feat(bot): dialog engine — scrub → safety → FSM → monitoring, consent, age gate, crisis
CI / ruff · pytest (pull_request) Successful in 25s

- Engine.handle registered via register_engine; lexicon-first safety (no LLM on ACUTE),
  fixed crisis script once per open crisis, POSSIBLE → C-SSRS screen
- FSM registry (@state/@on_enter/@trigger) with auto-loaded flows; core flow:
  new → consent → age_gate → module onboarding → idle, crisis, consent_revoked
- reusable scale session (buttons, extract_item + clarify, item 9 / C-SSRS buttons-only,
  crisis flags), execution of monitoring dialog actions, texts in config/texts/dialog.yaml

Refs #10

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-03 15:42:36 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 67cfe29c58
commit fa40be3d94
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"""Dialog engine (issue #10, ADR-004): `Engine.handle(token, event) -> list[Reply]`, channel-agnostic.
Pipeline for one incoming event (SPEC §3, guardrails #1, #2, #3):
text event
1. scrub() raw text → ScrubbedText. Raw text is never stored, logged or sent anywhere.
2. consent gate no valid consent → no LLM, nothing stored; only the local crisis lexicon runs
(protecting life does not need consent) and the core flow shows consent/refusal.
3. safety.check() lexicon FIRST. Lexicon ACUTE → the LLM is not called at all. Otherwise the LLM risk
classifier is an auxiliary signal combined as max(lexicon, llm): it can only raise risk.
ACUTE → fixed crisis script verbatim (once per open crisis), state `crisis`, structured
`safety_events` fact for lane B, MonitoringService.after_data_change() (lane B alerts).
POSSIBLE → C-SSRS screen (scale session) and back to the previous state (or crisis if high).
4. FSM the current state's handler (`app/dialog/flows/*`, `app/dialog/scale_session.py`).
button / system / start events skip 1–3 (no free text) and go through the same FSM.
After the FSM step: if clinical data were written → commit → `after_data_change()` → the returned *dialog*
actions are executed (`app/dialog/actions.py`). The engine never creates alerts (ADR-007).
Then a queued scale starts if the FSM rests (idle; only the C-SSRS while in crisis).
Persist: inbound message (scrubbed) + outbound replies + `dialog_state` — only with active consent.
Logs carry only the token, states and event codes (guardrail #8).
"""
import logging
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Any
from sqlalchemy.exc import InterfaceError, OperationalError
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.core import clock, safety
from app.core.privacy import scrub
from app.core.safety import SafetyResult, crisis_reply
from app.core.types import RiskLevel, ScrubbedText
from app.db import repo
from app.db.session import get_clinical_session
from app.dialog import scale_session
from app.dialog.actions import execute
from app.dialog.contracts import Event, Reply, register_engine
from app.dialog.crisis import crisis_open, no_consent_crisis_text, open_crisis
from app.dialog.flows import load_flows
from app.dialog.flows.core import close_crisis, revoke
from app.dialog.fsm import NO_CONSENT_STATES, RESTING_STATES, Ctx, Step, apply_data, enter_hook_for, handler_for
from app.dialog.texts import DialogTexts, load_dialog_texts
from app.llm.gateway import LLMGateway, get_gateway
from app.services.contracts import MonitoringService, get_monitoring
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Enter hooks may chain (scale done → next onboarding state → next scale); a cycle must not hang a request.
MAX_ENTER_CHAIN = 8
# DB unreachable: answer safely instead of failing the channel (connectivity errors only — bugs must surface).
_DB_DOWN = (OSError, OperationalError, InterfaceError)
@dataclass
class _Run:
replies: list[Reply] = field(default_factory=list)
notify: bool = False
def _consented(ctx: Ctx) -> bool:
return ctx.data.get("consent") is True and ctx.state not in NO_CONSENT_STATES
class Engine:
"""Real `DialogEngine`. `gateway` / `monitoring` are injectable for tests; by default resolved per call so
a monitoring implementation registered later (lane B, #38) is picked up."""
def __init__(self, *, gateway: LLMGateway | None = None, monitoring: MonitoringService | None = None) -> None:
self._gateway = gateway
self._monitoring = monitoring
async def handle(self, token: str, event: Event) -> list[Reply]:
texts = load_dialog_texts()
try:
async with get_clinical_session() as session:
return await self._handle(token, event, session, texts)
except _DB_DOWN as exc:
log.error("dialog db unavailable token=%s event=%s error=%s", token, event.type, type(exc).__name__)
return _degraded(event, texts)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ pipeline
async def _handle(self, token: str, event: Event, session: AsyncSession, texts: DialogTexts) -> list[Reply]:
row = await repo.get_dialog_state(session, token)
ctx = Ctx(
token=token,
state=row.state if row is not None else "new",
data=dict(row.data or {}) if row is not None else {},
now=clock.now(),
session=session,
gateway=self._gateway or get_gateway(),
monitoring=self._monitoring or get_monitoring(),
texts=texts,
)
state_before = ctx.state
run = _Run()
await self._apply(ctx, await self._route(ctx, event), run)
if run.notify:
# Monitoring (lane B) reads the DB in its own session: commit our writes first.
await self._save_state(ctx)
await session.commit()
actions = await ctx.monitoring.after_data_change(token)
await self._apply(ctx, await execute(ctx, actions), run)
await self._apply(ctx, await self._start_pending(ctx), run)
if _consented(ctx):
for reply in run.replies:
# Outgoing texts may quote the safety plan (names of relatives) — scrub before storing too.
await repo.add_message(
session, token=token, direction="out", text=scrub(reply.text), ts=ctx.now, fsm_state=ctx.state
)
await self._save_state(ctx)
log.info(
"dialog token=%s event=%s code=%s state=%s->%s replies=%d",
token,
event.type,
_event_code(event),
state_before,
ctx.state,
len(run.replies),
)
return run.replies
async def _route(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
consented = _consented(ctx)
if event.type == "text":
# (1) scrub before anything else: from here on only ScrubbedText exists for this message.
ctx.text = scrub(event.text or "")
if consented and _is_revoke_command(event.text or "", ctx.texts):
return await revoke(ctx)
if not consented:
return await self._no_consent_text(ctx, event)
await self._store_in(ctx, ctx.text)
return await self._safety(ctx, event)
if event.type == "button":
if consented and event.button == "consent:revoke":
return await revoke(ctx)
if consented:
await self._store_in(ctx, scrub(f"[button] {event.button}")) # button data comes from the client
return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
if event.type == "system":
if event.system == "doctor_ack":
return close_crisis(ctx)
if not consented:
return Step() # nothing is pushed to people without consent
if event.system == "scale_due" and event.params.get("scale"):
scheduled = bool(event.params.get("scheduled", True))
pending = scale_session.add_pending(ctx.data, str(event.params["scale"]), scheduled)
return Step(data={"pending_scales": pending}) # starts now if resting, else after the current step
return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
return await self._dispatch(ctx, event) # start
async def _no_consent_text(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
assert ctx.text is not None
# Lexicon only: without consent the text must not reach the LLM (third-party processing).
result = safety.check(ctx.text)
if result.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
log.warning("safety acute without consent token=%s rules=%s", ctx.token, result.matched_rules)
return Step(replies=[Reply(text=no_consent_crisis_text(crisis_reply(result.categories)), kind="crisis")])
return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
async def _safety(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
"""Guardrail #2: the safety decision is made before any LLM sees the message for anything else."""
assert ctx.text is not None
lexicon = safety.check(ctx.text)
if lexicon.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
result = lexicon # an acute message never reaches the LLM — not even the risk classifier
else:
result = safety.check(ctx.text, llm_signal=await ctx.gateway.risk_classify(ctx.text))
if result.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
handled = "crisis_repeat" if crisis_open(ctx.data) else "crisis_script"
log.warning("safety acute token=%s rules=%s handled=%s", ctx.token, result.matched_rules, handled)
step = open_crisis(ctx, result.categories, source=f"safety:{result.source}")
step.data["safety_events"] = self._safety_events(ctx, result, handled)
step.notify_monitoring = True # lane B escalates to the doctor on call
return step
if result.level == RiskLevel.POSSIBLE:
screen = ctx.texts.settings.risk_screen_scale
if self._can_screen(ctx, screen):
step = await scale_session.start_scale(
ctx, screen, return_state=ctx.state, scheduled=False, intro=ctx.texts.scale.risk_screen_intro
)
step.data["risk_screen_at"] = ctx.now.isoformat()
handled = "risk_screen"
else:
step = await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
handled = "dispatched"
log.info("safety possible token=%s rules=%s handled=%s", ctx.token, result.matched_rules, handled)
step.data["safety_events"] = self._safety_events(ctx, result, handled)
step.notify_monitoring = True
return step
return await self._dispatch(ctx, event)
def _can_screen(self, ctx: Ctx, screen: str) -> bool:
if crisis_open(ctx.data) or scale_session.active_scale(ctx.state) == screen:
return False
last = ctx.data.get("risk_screen_at")
if last is None:
return True
hours = (ctx.now - datetime.fromisoformat(last)).total_seconds() / 3600
return hours >= ctx.texts.settings.cssrs_cooldown_hours
def _safety_events(self, ctx: Ctx, result: SafetyResult, handled: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Structured safety fact for lane B (#38): no text, only codes. Newest last, capped."""
event = {
"ts": ctx.now.isoformat(),
"level": result.level.name.lower(),
"categories": result.categories,
"rules": result.matched_rules,
"source": result.source,
"handled": handled,
"state": ctx.state,
}
events = [*(ctx.data.get("safety_events") or []), event]
return events[-ctx.texts.settings.max_safety_events :]
async def _dispatch(self, ctx: Ctx, event: Event) -> Step:
handler = handler_for(ctx.state)
if handler is None:
# A state from a removed/renamed flow: recover instead of getting stuck.
log.error("dialog unknown state token=%s state=%s", ctx.token, ctx.state)
return Step(next_state="idle" if _consented(ctx) else "new")
return await handler(ctx, event)
async def _apply(self, ctx: Ctx, step: Step, run: _Run, depth: int = 0) -> None:
run.replies.extend(step.replies)
apply_data(ctx.data, step.data)
run.notify = run.notify or step.notify_monitoring
if not step.next_state or step.next_state == ctx.state:
return
ctx.state = step.next_state
hook = enter_hook_for(ctx.state)
if hook is None:
return
if depth >= MAX_ENTER_CHAIN:
log.error("dialog enter chain too long token=%s state=%s", ctx.token, ctx.state)
return
await self._apply(ctx, await hook(ctx), run, depth + 1)
async def _start_pending(self, ctx: Ctx) -> Step:
"""Start a queued scale when nothing else is being asked. In crisis only the risk screen may run."""
pending = list(ctx.data.get("pending_scales") or [])
if not pending or ctx.state not in RESTING_STATES:
return Step()
screen = ctx.texts.settings.risk_screen_scale
if ctx.state == "crisis":
pending_screen = [p for p in pending if p["scale"] == screen]
if not pending_screen:
return Step()
item = pending_screen[0]
else:
item = pending[0]
rest = [p for p in pending if p is not item]
step = await scale_session.start_scale(
ctx,
item["scale"],
return_state=ctx.state,
scheduled=bool(item.get("scheduled", True)),
intro=ctx.texts.scale.risk_screen_intro if item["scale"] == screen else None,
)
step.data["pending_scales"] = rest or None
return step
async def _store_in(self, ctx: Ctx, text: ScrubbedText) -> None:
await repo.add_message(ctx.session, token=ctx.token, direction="in", text=text, ts=ctx.now, fsm_state=ctx.state)
async def _save_state(self, ctx: Ctx) -> None:
await repo.set_dialog_state(ctx.session, token=ctx.token, state=ctx.state, data=ctx.data, now=ctx.now)
def _is_revoke_command(raw: str, texts: DialogTexts) -> bool:
return raw.strip().lower().rstrip(".!") in texts.commands.revoke
def _event_code(event: Event) -> str:
if event.type == "button":
return event.button or ""
if event.type == "system":
return event.system or ""
return "-"
def _degraded(event: Event, texts: DialogTexts) -> list[Reply]:
"""DB down: still answer a crisis message (lexicon only, no "doctor notified" — nobody could be notified)."""
if event.type == "text" and event.text:
result = safety.check(scrub(event.text))
if result.level == RiskLevel.ACUTE:
return [Reply(text=no_consent_crisis_text(crisis_reply(result.categories)), kind="crisis")]
if event.type == "system":
return []
return [Reply(text=texts.unavailable, kind="info")]
load_flows()
register_engine(Engine)